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Food Safety Meta-Controls in the Netherlands
Paul Verbruggen and Tetty Havinga*
Public food safety authorities in Europe and elsewhere have recently developed forms of co-
ordination and collaborationwith private compliance systems in themonitoring and enforce-
ment of public food safety laws. Such policies bring with them the risk of regulatory capture,
loss of transparency and fuzzy accountability relationships. In this paper we analyse how
the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) assesses and moni-
tors the functioning of private food safety control systems so it can use these private systems
in its own enforcement activities. We do so by discussing two national private systems that
have been formally accepted by the NVWA and are as such subject to its meta-control. The
article examines the safeguards that the public enforcement agency uses while coordinat-
ing its own activities with private food safety controls, the advantages and risks involved in
this strategy, and the extent to which this policy can be improved. From this we draw lessons
for public agencies elsewhere willing to engage with private compliance mechanisms. The
study is based on the analysis of policy documents, public and private regulation and open-
ended interviews with representatives of the public and private sector in the Netherlands.
I. Introduction
Public and private actors play a crucial role in ensur-
ing that food is safe to consume. While government
and industry have each developed sophisticated
regimes to regulate, manage and control food safety
risks, an important recent development is the rise of
arrangements in which public and private actors or-
ganize their respective regulatory activities to attain
the common goal of ensuring safe food. For govern-
ment the coordination of private regulatory capacity
appears attractive in times of global food chains, the
internationalisation of public food safety controls,
and national budget deficits.1However, it is not clear
how much such ‘hybridisation’ of food safety con-
trols contributes to higher levels of food safety.More-
over, certain risks seem manifest, including regula-
tory capture, transparency and accountability.2
Where states engage in such hybrid (or co-regula-
tory) arrangements, the key policy question is how
these risks can be controlled and managed. A public
enforcer is not likely to rely on private food safety
controlswithout ensuring that public legal norms are
compliedwithand the level of compliance is the same
as in case of public enforcement, if not better. In the
Netherlands, the Netherlands Food and Consumer
Product Safety Authority (NVWA) has recently de-
veloped a policy of assessing private systems of food
safety controls so as to use these private systems in
its own enforcement activities. This paper enquires
how the NVWA has designed this policy of ‘meta-
control’ (controlling the controllers) and asks which
safeguards the public enforcement agency deploys
while coordinating its own activities with private
food safety controls, and the extent to which this pol-
icy can be improved.
These are pressing questions, given the fact that
the NVWA is currently being challenged to more ef-
ficiently allocate enforcement resources, after succes-
sive rounds of budget cuts have seriously limited
those resources. Elsewhere, too, public enforcement
agencies in the food sector are developing collabora-
tive regulatory arrangements with private actors to
deploy their resources in more efficient and innova-
tive ways. Since the mid-2000s, the Food Standards
Agency in the United Kingdom has promoted better
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1 Tetty Havinga and Frans Van Waarden, Veilig voedsel: Toezicht
toevertrouwen? Sectorschets toezicht in de voedselsector,
Webpublicatie nr. 70 (Den Haag: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor
het Regeringsbeleid 2013).
2 Marian Garcia Martinez, Paul Verbruggen and Andrew Fearne
“Risk-based Approaches to Food Safety Regulation: What Role for
Co-regulation?”, 16 Journal of Risk Research (2013), pp. 1101-1121.
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coordination between the monitoring and enforce-
ment activities of the local food authorities and the
activities undertaken by the private sector,mainly fo-
cusing on so-called ‘farm assurance schemes’.3 The
Canadian Food Inspection Agency is developing
guidelines for the recognition of ‘third-party service
delivery providers’.4 Also the U.S. Food & Drug Ad-
ministration has indicated that, in the context of the
Food SafetyModernizationAct, it will deploy private
certification from recognised ‘third-party auditors’ to
verify the foodsafety complianceof importedgoods.5
Our investigation into the Dutch experience of meta-
control allows us to draw broader lessons for public
enforcement agencies elsewhere that consider to en-
gage with private compliance mechanisms.
The questions framed above are central to the ex-
plorative research set out in this paper, in which we
conducted a comparative analysis of twoprivate food
safety control systems – known as Bureau deWit and
RiskPlaza – which the NVWA has accepted as ‘sys-
tems of self-control’ for food produce. The method-
ological choices that underlie this analysis are ex-
plained in Section 4. In what follows, we first define
what we mean by ‘meta-control’ (2) and discuss the
factors that have driven the emergence of such a pol-
icy in the Netherlands (3). The analysis of Bureau de
Wit (5) and RiskPlaza (6) focuses on the design of
these systems of private control and how the NVWA
coordinates its own enforcement activities with
them. The results of this analysis are compared and
discussed to highlight the approach the NVWA has
taken to the respective private systems, and discuss
the risks involved in those approaches (7). Finally, we
present our conclusions and broader lessons for oth-
er public enforcement agencies (8).
II. Meta-Control of Food Governance
What do we mean by ‘meta-control’? In essence,
meta-control concerns the assessment and control of
(other) control systems. In an arrangement of meta-
controls, the actor that performs monitoring and en-
forcement activities (the first tier) is itself subject to
systems of control and oversight. The actor that car-
ries out this meta-control function (the second or
third tier) does not itself monitor or enforce regula-
tion vis-à-vis the regulated. Instead, its role is limit-
ed to managing, verifying and designing first-tier
control mechanisms and, more broadly, the frame-
work for meta-control. Meta-control thus implies a
two‑ (or three‑) stage process of monitoring and en-
forcement, in which the role of the meta-controller
changes from what Osborne and Gaebler have fa-
mously called rowing to steering.6
Meta-control is distinct from strategies that have
beendescribed as ‘enforced self-regulation’ and ‘man-
agement-based regulation’. These forms of regulation
are characterised by the public approval of private,
internalmanagementsystemsat the firm-level,which
enable individual firms to self-assess and ensure reg-
ulatory compliance.7 Meta-control, as we define the
concept, concerns the approval ofmonitoring and en-
forcement activities carried out by external actors
(such as third-party auditors and certification bodies)
who use their own food safety management systems
to assess and ensure regulatory compliance by the
firm. Nonetheless,meta-control can involve enforced
self-regulation or management-based regulation.
This is the case if the first tier controller (e.g. a third-
party auditor) verifies whether a firm’s internal risk
management system complies with a set of regulato-
ry norms by using a verification scheme, while being
subject to control and inspection by another body
(e.g. a certification scheme owner, accreditation body
orpublic enforcementagency). Inourview,meta-con-
3 Ruth Kirk-Wilson “Review of Food Assurance Schemes for the
Food Standards Agency”, 2002 available on the internet at
<http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20101209122142/http://
www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/foodassureguidance.pdf> last
consulted 31-10-2014 and Ruth Kirk-Wilson, “Review of Uptake
of FSA Food Assurance Scheme Guidance by UK Scheme Opera-
tors”, 2008 available on the internet at <http://collections
.europarchive.org/tna/20101209122142/http:/www.food.gov.uk/
multimedia/pdfs/foodassurancereview.pdf> last consulted
31-10-2014.
4 Canadian Food Inspection Agency “Improved Food Inspection
Model. Proposed Draft”, 2012, available on the internet at <
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/about-the-cfia/accountability/
inspection-modernization/proposed-draft/eng/1342549427433/
1342549854104> last consulted 31-10-2014.
5 U.S. Food & Drug Administration “FSMA Facts. Proposed Rule on
Accreditation of Third‐Party Auditors”, 2013, available on the
internet at <http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Food/
GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/UCM362561.pdf> last consulted
31-10-2014. See more specifically the contribution in this Special
Issue by Oldfield.
6 D. Osborne and T. Gaebler, Reinventing Government: How the
Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector (Reading,
MA: Addison-Wesley, 1992).
7 Cary Coglianese nad David Lazer, (2003) “Management-based
Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public
Goals”, 37 Law & Society Review (2003), pp. 691 et sqq.; Robyn
Fairman and Charlotte Yapp, (2005) “Enforced Self-Regulation,
Prescription, and Conceptions of Compliance within Small Busi-
nesses: The Impact of Enforcement”, 27 Law & Policy (2005),
p. 491 et seq.
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trol then concerns the relationship between the first
and second tier of control, and not – in contrast to
enforced self-regulation or management-based regu-
lation – risk management systems at firm-level.
Accordingly,meta-control involves those activities
that seek to regulate and steer the mechanisms, pro-
cedures and instruments for the monitoring and en-
forcement of regulatory compliance, but are man-
aged by others. In that sense, meta-control closely
aligns with the broader concept of ‘meta-regulation’.
While Coglianese and Mendelson have correctly ob-
served that there is no agreement on the definition
of meta-regulation,8 Parker aptly captures the com-
mon core of studies of meta-regulation by holding
that the concept principally concerns the activity of
‘(...) regulating the regulators, whether they be pub-
lic agencies, private corporate self-regulators or third
party gatekeepers’.9 Instead of independently setting
regulatory standards and monitoring and enforcing
them, the meta-regulator – just like the meta-con-
troller – operates at a distance by focusing on other
actors’ mechanisms. However, if these mechanisms
are no longer deemed adequate, the meta-regulator
intervenes and sets new standards with which the
first-tier regulator must comply.
Both public and private actors may act as meta-
regulators by exerting influence on or setting condi-
tions for regulatory activities,whether such activities
be standard-setting,monitoring or enforcement.10 In
this sense, meta-control is a form of meta-regulation
that focuses on the activities of monitoring and en-
forcement in a regulatory regime. Although here we
focusmerelyonmeta-controls exercisedby theDutch
public enforcement agency NVWA on two national
private food safety control systems, the concepts of
meta-regulation andmeta-control – in our view – not
only involve the regulationofprivate systemsbypub-
lic actors, but also the regulation of public regimes
by private actors,11 as well as the regulation of pub-
lic and private actors among themselves.12
IV. Drivers for Meta-control
Which factors have driven the development of
NVWA oversight on private food safety control sys-
tems in the Netherlands? One relevant factor is that
the capacity of public agencies to regulate food safe-
ty is increasingly under pressure due to the globali-
sation of food supply chains, and the recurrent insti-
tutional reforms and budget cuts. Today, supply
chains in the food sector are often international in
scope, which means that the various stages of food
production may not occur within the territory of a
singlepublic enforcement agency,whose jurisdiction
is territorially defined.Thismakes it difficult for such
agencies to warrant the safety and quality of the en-
tire production process. Moreover, the NVWA has
been confronted with a number of institutional re-
formsandbudget restrictions thathave seriously lim-
ited its capacity to perform periodic inspections to
assess compliance levels.13Within this context, coor-
dination with private food safety systems seems at-
tractive, since these systems may – it is contended –
compensate for the gaps that the NVWA has been
forced to leave unfulfilled.We therefore observe that
the NVWA is aligning its activities with other bod-
ies, both public and private, at national and interna-
tional levels.
A second factor that has played a decisive role in
the development of the NVWA policy of meta-con-
trol is the changes that have occurred in the legal
framework applying to food safety controls. In re-
sponse to the BSE crisis in 1996, this framework was
significantly reformed both at the national and Eu-
ropean level.14 Regulation 178/2002/EC currently
8 Cary Coglianese and Evan Mendelson, “Meta-regulation and Self-
regulation”, in: Martin Cave, Robert Baldwin, Martin Lodge (eds),
The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2010), p. 147. See also: Sharon Gilad, “It Runs in the
Family: Meta-regulation and Its Siblings” 4 Regulation & Gover-
nance (2010) 485.
9 Christine Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-regulation
and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
at p. 15.
10 Colin Scott, “Regulating Everything: From Mega- to Meta-regula-
tion”, 60 Administration (2012), pp. 61-89. Paul Verbruggen and
Tetty Havinga, “The Rise of Transnational Private Meta-Regula-
tors”, Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 71/2014, avail-
able on the internet at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2512843> last
consulted 31-10-2014.
11 Colin Scott, “Private Regulation of the Public Sector: A Neglected
Facet of Contemporary Governance”, 29 Journal of Law & Society
(2002), pp. 56-76.
12 Verbruggen and Havinga, The rise of transnational private meta-
regulators, supra note 10.
13 Havinga and Van Waarden, Veilig voedsel 2013, p. 81ff. After
several food safety (the salmonella Thomson and EHEC outbreaks)
and non-food safety related incidents (horsemeat), an increase in
the number of food safety inspectors was announced in Decem-
ber 2013. See: Brief van de staatssecretaris van Economische
Zaken en de minister van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport aan
de Tweede Kamer d.d. 19 december 2013, Plan van aanpak
NVWA).
14 Ellen Vos, “EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE
Crisis”, 23 Journal of Consumer Policy (2000), pp. 227-255.
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provides the general public legal framework for food
safety controls in the European Union (EU) and re-
quires food and feed producers to meet the applica-
ble regulatory standards in all stages of the produc-
tion, processing and distribution of food and feed.
The EU Member States must maintain an effective
legal system to see to it that food safety is ensured.15
By making the private sector primarily responsible
for food safety, it became possible for public author-
ities in the EU such as the NVWA to review and re-
allocate tasks and resources. The NVWAhas focused
on ‘system controls’ (systeemtoezicht), which implies
a shift from monitoring substantive food safety
norms tooversightofproductionprocesses andHAC-
CP-based systems adopted by individual compa-
nies.16
Other pieces of European legislation that concern
the exercise of inspections and controls further pro-
mote this reorientation. Regulation 882/2004/EC re-
quires that public authorities shall conduct frequent
food safety inspections, without prior notice, on a
risk basis, taking into account the identified risks,
past compliance records, the reliability of the author-
ity’s own checks and any other information that
might signal non-compliance.17 The regulation’s pre-
amble specifies the latter point, noting that the fre-
quency of the controls should be proportionate to the
risk, ‘taking into account the results of the checks car-
ried out by feed and food business operators under
HACCP based control programmes or quality assur-
ance programmes, where such programmes are de-
signed to meet requirements of feed and food law,
animal health and animal welfare rules’.18 This en-
ables agencies like the NVWA to ascribe an explicit
role to private food safety control systems in their in-
stitutional frameworks to ensure food safety. The re-
sult is that food safety controls in the Netherlands
are hybridised to a considerable degree.
A third important factor is the motivation of the
private sector to collaborate with the NVWA. Own-
ers of private food safety control systemshave aman-
ifest, commercial interest in having their system ac-
cepted by the public agency. After all, such public ap-
proval will serve as a sign of expertise, competence
and diligence, which is likely to attractmore (paying)
customers. This is a significant incentive for owners
to collaborate with the NVWA and subject them-
selves to its (meta-) control.19 This ‘buy in’ offers the
NVWA a possibility to collaborate with the private
sector since meta-control presupposes a certain lev-
el of cooperation and is, in that sense, no one-way
street. However, the presence of the commercial mo-
tivation for collaboration implies the risk that private
interests (attracting new customers, making a prof-
it) will undermine public ones (astute enforcement,
food safety). Tomaintain theproper balance between
these interests, the NVWA is challenged to set down
adequate safeguards and conditions underwhich the
collaboration can take place.
IV. Methodology
To explore how the NVWA assesses and monitors
private food safety control systems and deploys its
meta-control strategy, we have investigated two such
systems, namely Bureau de Wit (BDW) and
RiskPlaza. These are two of the twelve so-called ‘self-
control systems’ which the NVWA accepted in the
foodproduction, catering, and retail industries.20The
agency committed itself to taking these systems (and
their inspection and audit results) into accountwhen
determining its inspection frequency, the depth and
length of its inspections, and the interventions at par-
ticipating firms. The private systems that have been
accepted so far are voluntary and principally nation-
15 Article 17(1) and (2) of Regulation 178/2002/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down
the general principles and requirements of food law, establishing
the European Food Safety Authority and laying down procedures
in matters of food safety [2000] OJ L 31/1.
16 Jan-Kees Helderman and Marlies Honingh, (2009) Systeem-
toezicht. Een onderzoek naar de condities en werking van sys-
teemtoezicht in zes sectoren (Den Haag: Boom Juridische uitgev-
ers 2009). Martin De Bree, “Hoe landelijke inspectiediensten
omgaan met systeemtoezicht”, 2 Tijdschrift voor Toezicht (2010),
pp. 51-70.
17 Article 3(1) Regulation 882/2004/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on official controls per-
formed to ensure the verification of compliance with feed and
food law, animal health and animal welfare rules [2004] OJ L
191/1.
18 Recital 13 Regulation 882/2004/EC.
19 Not only the owners, but also food business operators have
noted that they would like to see the NVWA take (greater) consid-
eration of private systems and certifications in determining its
enforcement action. Almost half the firms certified by ISACert (a
major certification body in the Netherlands) suggested in a survey
conducted by ISACert among its customers that the NVWA does
not take sufficient consideration of their audit results to base its
inspections on. Available on the internet at <http://netherlands
.isacert.com/artikelen/Resultaten%20enquete
%20betrouwbaarheid%20certificaten-94.html> last consulted
31-10-2014.
20 <https://www.nvwa.nl/onderwerpen/toezicht-nvwa-eten-en
-drinken/dossier/kwaliteitssystemen-zelfcontrolesystemen
-levensmiddelen> last consulted 31-10-2014.
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al in scope. Certification for transnational standards,
such as those recognizedwithin theGlobal FoodSafe-
ty Initiative (GFSI), have not been accepted by the
NVWA, although the agency was investigating that
option at the time of writing.
The cases were not selected according to any the-
oretically driven principles. Very little was known
about the operation of accepted self-control systems
whenwe initiated our research, and that still remains
the case for now. The cases we selected were sought
to ensure a high level of variation. The system oper-
ated by BDW is one of seven accepted systems that
monitor compliance with guides to good hygienic
practice by artisan, non-industrial food business op-
erators. These guides are developed on a sectoral ba-
sis by the respective representative industry bodies
and submitted to government for formal approval,
after which they form the basis for NVWA inspec-
tions in the sector concerned.21 Preliminary research
indicated that the meta-control approach taken by
the NVWA vis-à-vis BDWwas not different from the
other accepted self-control systems forguides togood
hygienic practice. Accordingly, our selection of BDW
as a case study was random. RiskPlaza is one of the
five other systems accepted by the NVWA.22 The
choice to include RiskPlaza in our analysis is related
to the fact that many consider this system an exam-
ple of how the NVWA should collaborate with pri-
vate sector initiatives.23Theother four acceptedqual-
ity systems are each very different in nature and con-
cern an accredited food standard (Dutch HACCP), a
quality systemof a large singlemeat company, a qual-
ity assurance system for eggs, and the Dutch Quali-
ty Control System for rawmaterial assurance for the
production of fruit juices.
The selected private food safety control systems
differ as regards a number of elements that are like-
ly to influence how the NVWA designs and imple-
ments its meta-control approach. First, BDW is a
medium-sized, for-profit company with some 50
years of experience in verification and certification
services. All but one of the other accepted similar
control systemsare for-profit companies. By contrast,
RiskPlazawas launched in 2008 as amulti-stakehold-
er initiativeandwasadministeredby thenot-for-prof-
it Product Board. Second, firms participating in the
BDW system are no longer subject to official inspec-
tions by theNVWA. RiskPlaza audited firmswill still
be subject to NVWA inspections, but they will only
look at the parts not covered by the RiskPlaza audit.
Third, BDW only verifies compliance with recog-
nised guides to good hygienic practice. In the case of
RiskPlaza, the database that is part of the system con-
cretises the norms upon which RiskPlaza audits are
based. The norms are adopted in collaboration with
theNVWA, experts and certification bodies perform-
ing the audits. The co-regulatory arrangement with
RiskPlaza thus not only concerns the verification of
compliance with regulatory norms, but also the crys-
tallisation of those norms. These differences might
lead the NVWA to set different requirements for the
acceptance of the systems as the two cases demon-
strate differences with regard to the commercial in-
terests involved, the extent to which they replace
NVWA inspections and the scope of their regulato-
ry activities.
In describing the cases we identify the organisa-
tions that are concerned with the system, what their
respective responsibilities and obligations are, the le-
gal format into which those obligations have been
cast, and the methodology for compliance verifica-
tion (nature, purpose and frequency of visits). Sub-
sequently, we describe the meta-control approach of
the NVWA: what requirements does the NVWA set
for acceptance of the private system and how does
the NVWA monitor the system’s functioning after
acceptance? Our focus here is on the ways in which
the public agency seeks to manage and control the
risks that are concerned with this collaboration. The
case descriptions are based on publicly available doc-
uments (e.g. NVWA policy documents, legislation,
private regulation and audit protocols) and four
open-ended interviewswith representatives of BDW,
RiskPlaza, and the NVWA.24
21 Tetty Havinga, “National variations in the implementation and
enforcement of European food hygiene regulations. Comparing
the structure of food controls and regulations between Scotland
and the Netherlands”,35 Recht der Werkelijkheid (2014),
pp. 32-53.
22 See in general: <https://www.riskplaza.nl/index.php> last consult-
ed 31-10-2014.
23 Havinga and Van Waarden, Veilig voedsel, 2013, p. 61.
24 We conducted four interviews, namely with the ‘system expert’ of
RiskPlaza, the technical director of BDW (who is responsible for
the development of the verification system), an auditor working
for one of the RiskPlaza recognized certification bodies that
perform RiskPlaza Audit+ visits, and a NVWA staff member
responsible for developing of the policy of accepted self-control
systems in the catering, retail and health care sector. In addition,
we used data obtained from two interviews conducted by one of
the authors with a staff member of the Product Board involved in
the development of RiskPlaza and a staff member of the NVWA
responsible for the development of the policy of accepted self-
control systems for food and feed production.
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V. Bureau de Wit
1. System
BDW is a for-profit company offering verification
and consultation services concerning food safety,wa-
ter safety, air safety and rodent extermination. The
company was established some 50 years ago as a lab-
oratory, which today is accredited according to ISO
standards. BDWhas its own labelling scheme. Its ser-
vices include inspections, training, sample taking
and analysis, consultancy, and the development of
internal quality assurance systems. Customers oper-
ate in the catering, hotel, restaurant, café, retail and
health care sector. Many of the BDW customers are
part of branded chains or franchises, in which case,
the head office requires its subsidiaries or franchise
takers to apply for the BDW label to ensure a certain
level of quality and to prevent potential brand dam-
age by safety incidents.
The BDW food safety control system involves a
minimum of two annual inspections, during which
compliancewith the applicable guide to goodhygien-
ic practice and public regulation is verified. The in-
spection results are documented and (if needed) an
action plan is drafted to improve compliance. BDW
provides support and follow-up concerning the im-
plementation of such a plan. Firms that have been
rated 80% compliance in a minimum of two consec-
utive inspections are awarded the BDW label, includ-
ing the notification of that award on the BDW web-
site, and will benefit from a lower NVWA inspection
rate. A service contract between BDW and its cus-
tomers provides the legal basis for BDW inspections.
The contract entitles BDW to pass on to the NVWA
the audit results of customers in the context of a sys-
tem audit conducted by the agency on the BDW sys-
tem. BDW only informs the NVWA about firms that
meet the 80% threshold and qualify, to benefit from
a laxer official inspection regime. These firms are no
longer visited by the NVWA; the agency considers
the BDW audit sufficient.25
The normative framework applying to the BDW
inspections is the same as those that apply to official
NVWA inspections, namely public legal norms as op-
erationalised by the applicable guide to good hygien-
ic practice. There are, however, some important dif-
ferencesbetween the inspections carriedoutbyBDW
and the agency. BDW inspectors must check all re-
quirements set out by the guide during an inspec-
tion, whereas NVWA inspectors are permitted to fo-
cus on particular aspects (e.g. cleaning, sell-by dates,
cooling facilities, etc) as part of the prioritised goals
in theagency’s enforcementpolicy.Moreover, the lev-
el of required regulatory compliance is higher in case
of the BDW: while the NVWA will not take enforce-
ment measures if 60% of the requirements are met,
BDW should maintain a compliance standard of
80%. The BDW inspection frequency is also higher
than that of the NVWA. BDW claims that it visits its
customers four times a year, of which at least two vis-
its are unannounced. The NVWA requires a mini-
mum of one unannounced annual visit for accepted
self-control systems that monitor compliance with
guides to good hygienic practice.
2. Meta-Control
What instruments and procedures does the NVWA
use to assess andmonitor BDWperformance?Before
accepting the BDW system (and other self-control
systems thatmonitor compliancewithguides togood
hygienic practice), the NVWA carries out an exten-
sive initial assessment. This ex ante check starts off
with talks and discussionswith BDWtomap and test
the methodology of the private system. Aspects that
feature prominently in thesemeetings are the norms
that are assessed upon inspection, the research
methodology used (e.g. auditing, sample taking, wit-
ness audits), the way questions are asked, the train-
ing of inspectors, and the ways in which the system
is reviewed and updated.
If the NVWA is convinced of the robustness of the
private system, a so-called ‘address test’ is organised:
the system owner gives the NVWA aminimum of 40
addresses of customers that have been successfully
audited. The agency then verifies whether it sees
these firms as low-risk, based on the results of its own
inspection data. Subsequently, the NVWA will con-
duct a system audit at the system owner’s premises.
Two NVWA auditors who have not previously been
involved in the approval process assess the system
and inspection reports. The next step is that the sys-
tem owner solicits firms to participate in the system.
If some 100 firms participate, the NVWA performs a
25 BDW, Inspectieprotocol Zelfcontrolesysteem BDW, 1 March
2012, Version 7 (on file with authors).
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‘reality check’ to verify whether the system ensures
a sufficiently high level of compliance. Should irreg-
ularities emerge, the NVWA can organise verifica-
tion audits, in which case a private assessor will con-
duct an inspection, after which an NVWA inspector
will directly visit the same premise to assess the sit-
uation.Onceall these stepsarecompleted, theNVWA
accepts the private system and announces it on its
website.
Several system owners were interested in having
their system assessed and accepted by the NVWA.
However, the NVWA did not offer a clear set of cri-
teria that system owners shouldmeet to attain accep-
tance, nor was the procedure for acceptance formal-
ized. By its own admission, the NVWA did not want
to use a straightjacket to apply to all systems. This
standpoint can be explained by the experience the
authority gained from its involvement in the earlier
policy framework called ‘Oversight of Inspection’,
which was applied to egg quality controls in the
Dutch poultry sector. As the contribution in this Spe-
cial Issue by Van der Voort highlights, the strictness
and inflexibility of the criteria imposed on the own-
ers of the private control system led to its eventual
demise. Yet, the meta-regulatory approach now tak-
en by the NVWA led to other issues, namely uncer-
tainty among system owners who wanted to apply
for NVWA acceptance and a certain level of resent-
ment among those owners who saw their competi-
tors gain acceptance.
Our interviews suggest that the NVWA uses the
following set of criteria before accepting BDW and
other six private systems verifying compliance with
guides to good hygienic practice as ‘self-control sys-
tems’:
i. Participating firms should be artisan, non-indus-
trial food business operators.
ii. System owners ensure food safety by verifying
compliance with recognised guides to good hy-
gienic practice.
iii. Inspections should cover all elements of the
guide.
iv. Compliance levels of 80%.
v. If non-compliance is observed, incidents must be
re-inspected in a follow-up visit.
vi. A minimum of one inspection per annum.
vii. Inspections must be unannounced.
viii. Participating firms should formally approve the
exchangeof audit results between the systemown-
er and the NVWA.
Accreditation is not required, nor does the NVWA
set specific requirements for the training and expe-
rience of inspectors (although this is part of the sys-
tem audit conducted by the NVWA upon acceptance
of the system). Moreover, although the institutional
separation of consultancy and inspection is not re-
quired, if it is absent then this does raise concerns at
the NVWA. In common with the other six accepted
self-control systems, BDW reports monthly to the
NVWA on the firms participating in the system. The
NVWA assumes that these firms are compliant with
applicable regulations and does not inspect them.
Finally, it is not clear how the NVWA will contin-
ue to assess and monitor the performance of private
systems like that of BDW after acceptance. The
NVWA anticipates that this ex post control will in-
clude annual meetings complemented by an office
audit one year and random spot checks at participat-
ing firms in the alternate year. The NVWA organis-
es a semi-annual plenarymeeting towhich all accept-
ed self-control systems are invited to discuss new de-
velopments and the general functioning of the sys-
tems and their collaborationwith theNVWA in prac-
tice (e.g. in case of an outbreak of a food-borne de-
cease).
VI. RiskPlaza
1. System
RiskPlaza is a private HACCP-based audit scheme to
control food safety hazards in raw materials and in-
gredients for food production. The scheme was
launched in 2008 by the semi-public trade associa-
tion Agricultural Product Board (Productschap
Akkerbouw). It initially applied only to the bakery
sector, which had initiated the development of the
scheme in 2005, but its application was soon extend-
ed to other sectors (vegetables, fruits, nuts, poultry,
meat, oils and fats, convenience food). RiskPlaza con-
sists of two elements: a database that identifies po-
tential food safety hazards and the ‘RiskPlazaAudit+’
system. The database concretises EU and national
food safety regulations and is adopted and revised by
the Product Board in collaborationwith experts from
various branches of industry and the certification
bodies that are recognised as qualified auditors for
the RiskPlaza Audit+ system. Participating firms in
the food chain can consult the database to ensure that
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theproducts theysourcearesafe.Acovenantbetween
the Product Board and NVWA defines the reciprocal
responsibilities.26 It determines, amongst others, that
theNVWAwill use the database for inspections, such
that ‘a common truth’ exists about the potential haz-
ards in raw materials and food ingredients.27
The RiskPlaza Audit+ system supports suppliers
in the food processing industry to comply with Arti-
cle 5 Regulation 2004/852/EC, which requires that
food business operators have in place, implement
and maintain permanent procedures based on the
HACCP principles to verify whether the raw materi-
als and ingredients they source are safe. The Product
Board does not consider the audit system a certifica-
tion scheme, despite the fact that certification bod-
ies recognised by RiskPlaza perform the audits. No
actual certificate is awarded after a successful audit:
a firm merely receives the status of ‘RiskPlaza Au-
dit+’.28 Suppliers of raw materials and food ingredi-
ents can apply for a RiskPlaza Audit+ provided they
already have a certificate from a HACCP-based food
safety scheme, such as the BRC Global Standard or
FSSC 22000, or from an NVWA-approved guide to
good hygienic practice. Whereas such HACCP certi-
fication concerns the assessment of food production
processes, the RiskPlaza Audit+ is an additional test
– hence the ‘plus’ – specifically focused on control-
ling hazards in rawmaterials and food ingredients.29
The compliance assessment during the RiskPlaza
Audit+ is an administrative audit of formalized risk
management procedures, registration requirements
and the documentation of product analyses. Sample
taking and analysis are not involved. These audits
take place on the basis of announced visits, although
unannounced visits are possible.30 Four accredited
third party certification bodies carry out the
RiskPlaza audits,31 which are usually conducted to-
gether with or after a regular HACCP food safety au-
dit. An audit is performedannually and is thus broad-
ly similar to the auditing frequency of regular HAC-
CP-based private standards. The ‘system expert’ of
RiskPlaza assesses the requirements that are set for
the audits.32 This expert is an external consultant
who evaluates the performance of the certification
bodies as regards aspects of an audit’s comprehen-
siveness, consistency and quality, and reports to the
Board annually. For that purpose, the expert collects
all audit reports filed by the certification bodies and
also participates in audits conducted by these bodies
(witness audits).33
If a producer sources its raw materials or ingredi-
ents from a supplier that has been awarded the sta-
tus of RiskPlaza Audit+, the NVWA considers it to
meet the obligations under Article 5 Regulation
2004/852/EC on sales verification. Separate verifica-
tion of the product sourced from that supplier is no
longer necessary and the agency will not inspect this
issue.34 Furthermore, NVWA inspections at the
RiskPlaza Audit+ supplier will cease.35 The public
agency remains competent, however, to perform in-
spections as regards other aspects of food safety reg-
ulation.
Some 70 firms have been audited following the
RiskPlaza Audit+ scheme.36 The vast majority of
these firms are located in theNetherlands, but a small
number are based in Belgium and Germany. As of
January 2014, product boards have been dissolved as
part of a wider administrative reform in the Nether-
lands. To ensure the continuity of RiskPlaza its ad-
ministration and operations have been transferred
to the legal entities called RiskPlaza Foundation
(RiskPlaza Stichting) and RiskPlaza BV. Soon after
we concluded our interviews and document analysis
early 2014, RiskPlaza was sold to a commercial par-
ty. At the time ofwriting, it was clear that theNVWA,
for the time being, would continue to accept
RiskPlaza as a private self-control system following
the same criteria and procedures it had designed pre-
viously.37 We have not received any indication that
the initial meta-controls strategy designed by the
NVWA has changed.
26 Convenant horizontaal toezicht tussen het Productschap Akker-
bouw (systeemeigenaar RiskPlaza) en de Nederlandse Voedsel-
en Warenautoriteit, Staatscourant 2012, 13450.
27 Ibid, at ‘Doelen en uitgangspunten’, no. 7.
28 Product Board, ‘Auditreglement RiskPlaza-audit+ systeem (versie
2.0, maart 2013, Den Haag), p. 23, available on the internet at
<http://www.productschapakkerbouw.nl/files/PA_28032013_B14
.pdf> last consulted 31-10-2014.
29 Product Board, Auditreglement 2013, supra note 28, p. 20
30 Product Board, Auditreglement 2013, supra note 28, p. 24.
31 Product Board, ‘Certificerende instellingen’, <https://www
.riskplaza.nl/index.php/home/index/3/2> accessed May 2014.
32 Product Board, Auditreglement 2013, supra note 28, p. 33.
33 Product Board, Auditreglement 2013, supra note 28, p. 39-40.
34 Convenant RiskPlaza – NVWA 2012, supra note 26, at ‘Ver-
plichtingen NVWA’, no. 4.
35 Ibid, at ‘Verplichtingen NVWA’, no. 5.
36 The list is available on the internet at <https://www.riskplaza.nl/
index.php/home/index/3/1> last consulted 31-10-2014.
37 Personal communication NVWA.
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2. Meta-Control
How does the NVWA assess and monitor the
RiskPlaza scheme? Several instruments and proce-
dures apply. First, the NVWA has been closely in-
volved in setting up the scheme. When the first dis-
cussions between the Product Board and the bakery
sector took place in 2005, the NVWA was asked to
be involved. Now, the NVWAhas a formal role in the
governance of the regime as the agency participates
in the so-called ‘expert meetings’.38 In these hearings
the content of the hazard database is adopted, deter-
mining the specific ingredient groups and factsheets
of related hazards. The hearings also discuss recent
developments and changes in food safety regula-
tion.39 Participation in the expert hearings, which
take place at most four times a year, enables the
NVWA to survey the substantive standards upon
which RiskPlaza audits are based. Accordingly, it can
see to it that the level of protection warranted by
RiskPlaza is adequate, and that changes in legislation
are correctly and swiftly implemented.
Second, the NVWA also participates in so-called
‘harmonisationmeetings’ that takeplaceannuallybe-
tween the auditors of the recognised certification
bodies and the RiskPlaza system expert.40 During
these hearings the system expert presents the analy-
sis of theaudit reports submittedbycertificationbod-
ies and the witness audits. Cases are also discussed,
although not so much at the level of individual certi-
fication bodies, but rather as examples to illustrate
good (or bad) practices.Whereas participation in the
expert hearings enables the NVWA to remain in-
formed about the substantive standards upon which
RiskPlaza audits are based, participation in the har-
monisation hearings offers the NVWA up-to-date in-
formation about the way audits are performed. In
conclusion, it must thus be considered that the
NVWA is closely involved in the governance and im-
plementation of the RiskPlaza scheme.
The exchange of information between the Prod-
uct Board and the NVWA also enables the latter to
monitor and assess performance. The covenant re-
quires the Product Board to notify the NVWA in case
of significant changes in the system, to grant the
agency access to the database and to offer insights
into the audit system’s functioning.41 From a public
interest perspective it is worth observing that there
is no obligation on the side of the Product Board to
advise and alert the NVWA in cases of major non-
compliance and serious risks to public health and
safety.42 The audit reports are not automatically
shared with the NVWA and the agency did not re-
quire the Product Board to oblige the recognised cer-
tification bodies to share them either. Nonetheless,
there are several ways in which the NVWA can ac-
cess information about regulatory compliance by
firms possessing the RiskPlaza Audit+ status. First of
all, the NVWAcanmonitor the RiskPlazawebsite for
changes in the status of firms. Second, itmay request
the audit report from the firm upon inspection.
Third, the NVWA receives general information on
the performance of audited firms and certification
bodieswhenparticipating in theharmonisationhear-
ings. Finally, the NVWA may organise a system au-
dit to evaluate the entire scheme.43 As the covenant
notes, audit reports and random spot checks at par-
ticipating firmsmay be part of this audit. TheNVWA
performed its first system audit on the RiskPlaza
scheme late in 2013. It consisted of an office audit,
reviewing the system’s robustness, client records,
training programmes and other relevant documen-
tation. The audit concluded that RiskPlaza is a pri-
vate system that ‘operates properly and offers a sub-
stantive contribution to the assurance of the safety
of food ingredients’44 and offers a number of recom-
mendations for improvement of the system.
VII. Comparison and Discussion
1. Meta-Control
There are several similarities between the ways in
which the NVWA organises its meta-controls as re-
gards the two accepted self-control systems. In both
cases, BDW and RiskPlaza, a clear set of conditions
38 Convenant RiskPlaza – NVWA 2012, supra note 26, at ‘Ver-
plichtingen NVWA’, no. 1.
39 Product Board, Auditreglement 2013, supra note 28, p. 37.
40 Product Board, Auditreglement 2013, supra note 28, p. 40.
41 Convenant RiskPlaza – NVWA 2012, supra note 26, at ‘Ver-
plichtingen Productschap Akkerbouw’, no. 2, 5 and 7.
42 The covenant concerns only the situation that the NVWA pro-
vides information to the Product Board about food safety inci-
dents at participating firms. See Convenant RiskPlaza – NVWA
2012, supra note 26, at ‘Verplichtingen Productschap Akker-
bouw’, no. 8.
43 Ibid, at ‘Verplichtingen NVWA’, no. 2-3.
44 NVWA (Internal Audit division), ‘RiskPlaza Audit’, November
2013 (not published, on file with authors), p. 5.
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for acceptance was absent from the start; these con-
ditions have been set along the way as experience
with the policy grew. In the case of private control
systems such as BDW a number of clear-cut criteria
that apply to similar private control systems are now
used. RiskPlaza, however, remains a unique system,
in which the NVWA has been closely involved from
its inception.
In both cases the NVWA conducted an audit on
the systems before accepting them. They also per-
formed random checks at participating firms to as-
sess the reliability of the systems, that is, to verify
whether the private inspection results did not differ
significantly from the findings of the NVWA when
visiting the premises. It is too soon to draw any con-
clusions about the effectiveness of the NVWAmeta-
controls after the systems of BDW and RiskPlaza
were accepted.45 The goal is to monitor system per-
formance by organising intermittent meetings, sys-
tem audits and random verification checks.
There are also some significant differences. The
NVWA has not required RiskPlaza to employ unan-
nounced audits, whereas this is an undisputed con-
dition for the acceptance of private control systems
such as BDW. Another example is that the NVWA
has the possibility to request at any moment an au-
dit report of a firm audited by BDW. The NVWA has
that option since it obliges BDW to require from its
customers the possibility to forward audit results to
the NVWA. In the case of RiskPlaza, audit reports
can only be shared with the NVWA in the context of
a system audit. The certification bodies recognised
by RiskPlaza do not demand from their customers
the ability to share any audit results with the NVWA,
nor does RiskPlaza require these certification bodies
to do so upon recognition. Instead, the contracts be-
tween the certification bodies and their customers
typically include confidentiality clauses that bar
them from sharing any information on audit results
with third parties. The NVWA will be able to access
the audit results, when inspecting the firm if it asks
for the audit reports. RiskPlaza is obliged to main-
tain a public record (website) of the RiskPlazaAudit+
firms. That obligation is absent in the case of BDW.
The difference is smaller than it seems, however.
BDW maintains on its website a list of customers
with aBDWcertificate, provided the customer agrees
to that notification.
2. Benefits and Risks
Generally speaking, a key benefit for public authori-
ties such as the NVWA of collaborating with private
control systems such as BDW and RiskPlaza appears
to lie in the efficiencies that can be achieved in mon-
itoring and enforcement. In times of budgetary con-
straints, engaging with pre-existing private assur-
ance schemes can indeed be a cost-effective alterna-
tive to reduce inspection costs, whilemaintaining in-
spection coverage. Furthermore, the private schemes
that have been recognized may contribute to better
compliance by firms as they tend to visit themmore
often, and they may combine inspection and advice
in their services, arguably leading to a better under-
standing among firms of their responsibilities under
food safety laws.46
Owners of the accepted schemes are likely to at-
tract more customers, as a successful audit process
will offer such customers a favourable inspection
regime. One way or the other, the acceptance by the
NVWA of the private control systemwill function as
a sign of quality and will help the owners to gain (a
bigger) market share. The fact that commercial inter-
ests are at stake also makes it more important for the
NVWA to ensure that its acceptance procedure is
transparent, consistent and fair such that other (ri-
val) private schemes are not unduly excluded.
Firms that participate in the accepted schemes
benefit from fewer official inspections and may
therefore experience less red tape and lower admin-
istrative burdens in relation to the NVWA. This per-
ception may constitute an important driver for food
business operators to comply with the scheme’s re-
quirements. We do not contend that the overall bur-
den of rule compliance will decrease, however. The
opposite might be true. Given that the private con-
trol systems bring their own set of food safety rules
and inspection protocols, that burden is likely to in-
crease. Considering also that the firmmustmake sub-
stantial investments to comply with these rules and
45 This conclusion was also drawn in the NVWA audit for RiskPlaza
(supra note 44, p 5-6).
46 See also: M. Wright, G. Palmer, A Shahriyer, R Williams and R.
Smith (2013) ‘Assessment and Comparison of Third Part Assur-
ance Schemes in the Food Sector: Towards a Common Frame-
work’, Final Report for the Food Standards Agency, Project Code
FS245006, available on the internet at <http://www.foodbase.org
.uk/results.php?f_category_id=&f_report_id=835> last consulted
31-10-2014, p. 45.
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pay for the accompanying compliance audits, sign-
ing up to these private schemes may be less econom-
ically efficient when compared to official public in-
spections.
From the perspective of the public enforcement
agency, there are also considerable risks involved in
the current meta-control strategy. For one, an accept-
ed scheme does not provide an absolute warranty of
rule compliance. Certificate holders have been found
to violate food safety laws.47 Private auditors are paid
for by the auditeeswhich constitutes a structural con-
flict of interest between the financial interests of the
auditor and protecting the public from food safety
risks.48 Also the fact that the functions of third par-
ty audits do not overlap with those of official inspec-
tions and that certainmethodologies (sample testing)
are not used limits the purpose for which the private
schemes can be used by public authorities. Public au-
thorities are thus challenged to create an operational
framework by which relevant changes in the status
of certified firms are instantly communicated to it.
In this sense it is disturbing to see that the infor-
mation sharing arrangements designed by the
NVWA and the accepted private control systems do
not require auditors to advise and alert public author-
ities in case of major incidents of non-compliance
and serious risks to public health and safety. The
arrangement currently used relies on the authority
to actively check certification data, which generates
the risk that non-compliant firms can slip through
the meta-control system. Unless the agency can allo-
cate sufficientmanpower to the checking of these da-
ta and can rely on the accuracy of these data, there
is a serious concern of transparency here in terms of
the information flowing from the private schemes to
the public agency. The reason for this asymmetry in
compliance information relates to the incorporation
of professional secrecy obligations on the part of pri-
vate auditors in the contracts they sign with food
business operators. Such contractual obligations are
a major obstacle for the NVWA to acquire informa-
tion from private schemes as regards non-compli-
ance.
Another concern is that the inspection frequency
of the public authorities may be too low to incen-
tivize firms to participate in the accepted private
schemes. Participating firms make considerable in-
vestments to comply with the scheme’s require-
ments. Thepremise that these firmswill benefit from
amore favourable inspection regime can only be true
if the public authority has the capacity to inspect the
non-participating firms. It appears that, at least in
the Netherlands, the NVWA does not have that ca-
pacity.49 This leads to free rider problems: non-par-
ticipating firms enjoy lower costs and may be sub-
ject to the same inspection rate as firms that do par-
ticipate. This potentially undermines the effective-
ness of the entire collaboration.
There are also concerns as regards the process of
accepting private schemes. In both cases of BDWand
RiskPlaza, recognition revolved around general cri-
teria of independence, transparency, inclusiveness
and legal compliance. However, formalised proce-
dures that guide the process of acceptance had not
been established. As a consequence, the procedure
for applying for recognition, the criteria that must
bemet, and the period forwhich recognition is grant-
ed remained unclear for the systems involved. Fur-
thermore, there is no formal procedure to monitor
the performance of recognized schemes, nor to as-
sesswhether they are eligible for an extension of (the
term of) recognition. While it can be argued that an
increased level of formalisation and proceduralisa-
tion of scheme recognitionmay hamper the develop-
ment of co-regulatory arrangements, the absence of
any official guidance on how andwhen to gain recog-
nition challenges principles like transparency, con-
sistency and fairness in decision-making, which
clearly apply to government bodies such as the
NVWA.
VIII. Conclusions and Broader Lessons
Our analysis shows that the NVWA has carefully
tried to design itsmeta-control strategy and establish
the conditions for collaborationwith the private food
safety control systems of BDW and RiskPlaza. Its ap-
proach is characterised by pragmatism and it has
managed to lay down some fundamental safeguards
for its meta-control to be successful. The difference
between the meta-control exercised in the case of
47 H Beuger (2012) ‘Overheidstoezicht en certificatie: Verhogen
betrouwbaarheid vergt inspanning van alle betrokkenen’ 45
Voedingsmiddelentechnologie, p. 21.
48 Timothy D. Lytton and Lesley K. McAllister (2014) ‘Oversight in
Private Food Safety Auditing: Addressing Auditor Conflict of
Interest’, Wisconsin Law Review, p. 289-335.
49 Havinga and Van Waarden, Veilig voedsel 2013, p 80.
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BDW and RiskPlaza is primarily related to the con-
sequences of NVWA’s acceptance of these systems
for the NVWA’s monitoring and enforcement activ-
ities. In case of BDW a more comprehensive (and
stricter) set of conditions apply than in the case of
RiskPlaza, since a positive BDW inspection leads to
the termination of NVWA inspections. In the case of
RiskPlaza a successful audit only leads to a partial re-
placement of NVWA inspections. Another signifi-
cant point is that the NVWA was closely involved in
establishing the RiskPlaza system and continues to
have a formal position in the adoption of the norms
onwhich controls are based. As regards the other cir-
cumstance that we supposed to exert an influence on
the design of the meta-control strategy, namely the
commercial nature of the system owners, we found
no evidence.
The analysis also reveals a number of weak points
in the meta-control strategy. A significant shortcom-
ing in the current design of the strategy is that the
agency does not have the capacity to submit non-par-
ticipating firms to a closer inspection regime than
firms that participate in accepted self-control sys-
tems. Accordingly, non-participant firms enjoy low-
er costs than participating firms. The free rider prob-
lem that thus emerges makes the accepted self-con-
trol systems rather unattractive. Furthermore, the in-
formation exchange between the NVWA and accept-
ed systems relies on the agency actively to check com-
pliance data. The systems, their auditors and inspec-
tors are not required to advise and alert the agency
in case of major non-compliance and serious risks to
public health and safety. This generates the risk that
instances of non-compliance will go unnoticed and
slip through the meta-control system. Moreover, the
meta-control strategy would benefit in terms of its
uniformity, fairness and transparency from a degree
of formalisation of the procedure of accepting pri-
vate food safety control systems. In this regard, we
view the recent publication by the NVWA of a poli-
cy document on ‘criteria for the acceptance of quali-
ty control systems’ as a verywelcomedevelopment.50
A principle question remains of what will be left
of the meta-control strategy when a food safety cri-
sis is traced back to a food business operator that par-
ticipated in an accepted private control system. Will
the agency then be able to explain to the public at
large that it was acceptable to leave the actual moni-
toring of food safety compliance of that firm to a
commercial entity without exercising public over-
sight itself? It is to be expected that the media and
politics will be fiercely critical, questioning the ac-
countability of the agency. The way in which the
NVWA will handle such a crisis will constitute the
litmus test for its meta-control strategy.
At this moment, it is also too early to tell whether
the NVWA’s meta-control strategy will attain its ob-
jectives. The oversight strategy has so far been pri-
marily limited to ex ante checks and audits upon ac-
ceptance of the private systems. It is largely unclear
how and with which frequency the NVWA will con-
tinue to assess performance after acceptance and
which terms and conditions will apply for re-accep-
tance (or the revocation of acceptance for that mat-
ter).51 As noted, the agency is currently considering
the option of extending its meta-control strategy to
transnational certification schemes benchmarked by
the GFSI. The possible acceptance of such schemes
in the near future will raise the same questions that
have been addressed here: what criteria apply for ac-
ceptance and howwill scheme performance after ac-
ceptance be monitored? In considering the GFSI
benchmarked schemes the NVWA can build on its
experience with national private food control sys-
tems, eventually to develop a clear and consistent
methodology of meta-controls.
The lessons we draw from the Dutch experience
for public (food safety) agencies elsewhere willing to
engage with private compliance schemes are the fol-
lowing. First, it is recommended that agencies organ-
ise a thorough pre-assessment of the private schemes
theywant to involve in theirmonitoring and enforce-
ment policies. Such an ex ante assessment should at
least include a review of the degree to which the
schemes ensure legal compliance, the means and
methods of standard-setting and conformity assess-
ment used, and the ways in which the scheme own-
er ensures the expertise, training, and integrity of its
inspection staff. Upon recognition of the scheme, in-
formationmanagement and exchange arrangements
must be set that allow the agency to verify the status
of participant firms (and thus their degree of compli-
50 NVWA “Criteria voor acceptatie van kwaliteitssystemen door de
NVWA” (July 2014) available on the internet at <http://www
.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/
2014/07/07/criteria-voor-acceptatie-van-kwaliteitssystemen-door
-de-nvwa/criteria-voor-acceptatie-van-kwaliteitssystemen-door-de
-nvwa.pdf> last consulted 31-10-2014.
51 The 2014 policy document remains very general in this regard.
See NVWA 2014, supra note 50, p. 5.
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ance)under the scheme.Regular reportingduties and
warning obligations in case of eminent (food) safety
risks should also be part of those arrangements. To
reduce the agency’s dependence of information pro-
vided by the recognised schemes, it should also per-
form spot checks at participant firms and conduct of-
fice audits and on-site shadow or witness audits to
verify overall scheme performance. If recognition of
the scheme leads to a reduced official inspection
regime for participating firms, the agency should en-
sure that non-participating firms are subject to a
stricter inspection rate so to prevent free rider prob-
lems. Finally, the agency should seek to progressive-
ly formalise its meta-control strategy.While working
from a set of predefined criteria curbs the flexibility
needed in policy development, the complete absence
of official documentation once the policy has crys-
tallised will challenge principles of good governance
like transparency, consistency and fairness in deci-
sion-making.
